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Successive Torts Resulting in a Single,
Indivisible Injury: Plaintiffs, Prepare to
Prove the Impossible
Carlsonv. K-Mart Corp.'

I. INTRODUCTION
In most lawsuits, plaintiffs' medical experts can accurately allocate
plaintiffs' injuries to a specific, causal factor. In some instances, however, two
events may combine to cause an injury that is incapable of rational
apportionment, even by the most learned medical expert. In such a case, the
indivisible injury doctrine may relieve a plaintiff of the difficult burden of
proving which tortfeasor caused her injuries. The indivisible injury doctrine,
however, does not benefit all plaintiffs who have suffered an injury that cannot
be apportioned. As illustrated by the instant case, certain plaintiffs must prove
the impossible, namely, which tortfeasor caused their injuries, even though doing
so may be a medical impossibility.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 8, 1992, while shopping at K-Mart in Independence, Missouri,
Georgia Carlson was injured when boxes containing crockpots fell from an
elevated shelf and struck her in the face and head.2 That same day, Carlson
sought treatment at a hospital for numerous injuries, including injuries to her
back.3 In the weeks following the accident, Carlson's back pain intensified, and
she sought further medical treatment. Tests performed on Carlson's injured
back revealed a protruding disk in her lumbar spine and helped explain the cause
of her back pain as well as the numbness she was experiencing in her right
thigh.5 These tests further revealed that Carlson had degenerative disk disease,
a disease that is often asymptomatic and a normal part of the aging process.6

1. 979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998). Note: The Missouri Supreme Court remanded this
case because of an error regarding the trial court's damage instruction. Id. at 148. This
Note, however, focuses on issues of liability, which were upheld by the Missouri
Supreme Court. Id. Therefore, the majority of this Note's information and analysis is
derived from the Western District's opinion, Carlsonv. K-Mart Corp., No. WD53151,
1998 WL 6951, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, 979
S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998).
2. Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 145.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 145-46.
6. Carlson v. K-Mart, 979 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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On December 12, 1992, a drunk driver involved in a high-speed chase with
the police struck the rear of Carlson's car.' As an ambulance rushed Carlson to8
a hospital, she complained that her back hurt more than it had previously.
Notwithstanding her complaint, the hospital released her after a fifty minute
examination. 9 In the mpnths following the automobile accident, Carlson's back
pain continually worsened, and during March of 1994, surgery was performed
on the injured region." Surgery, however, failed to alleviate Carlson's
symptoms." Carlson's subsequent diagnosis was bleak: her back condition
would likely persist for life and would certainly require future medical
treatment. 2
Carlson sued only K-Mart for her injuries. At trial she argued that the
accident at K-Mart and the automobile accident combined to create one injury
"which was not susceptible to division on any rational basis."' 3 As such, she
claimed that she was entitled to recover all damages from K-Mart. 4 To prove
this theory, Carlson presented several expert medical witnesses." These
witnesses, however, were unable to medically determine the effect of the K-Mart
incident on Carlson's back problems.' 6 K-Mart, on the other hand, argued that
Carlson's back condition was not caused by its negligence but by either the
automobile accident or the degenerative back disease. 7
Although the jury returned a verdict in Carlson's favor and awarded her

$100,000, Carlson appealed the verdict. On appeal, Carlson claimed that the
circuit court erred by refusing to accept her modified damage instruction. 8

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
1O.Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., No. WD53151,1998 WL 6951, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan. 13, 1998), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998). Carlson sought
the benefit of the indivisible injury doctrine. As will be explained more fully in Part III
of this Note, the indivisible injury doctrine allows plaintiffs to hold multiple tortfeasors
jointly and severally liable if their negligence combines to create an injury which is not
susceptible to division on any rational basis.
14. Carlson, 1998 WL 6951, at *1.
15. Id.at*2.
16. Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., 979 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Mo. 1998).
17. Id. at 148.
18. Carlson, 1998 WL 6951, at *2. Because multiple possible causes of Carlson's
back injury existed, the trial court gave the jury the following verdict directing
instruction:
Your verdict must be for Plaintiff if you believe:
First, there were boxes stored on the overhead shelf of the Kitchen
Comer and as a result the aisles in the Kitchen Comer were not reasonably
safe, and
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/7
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Carlson contended that the trial court "denied her the benefit of recovering for
her 'indivisible injury"" 9 by failing to modify the damages instruction. The
appellate court disagreed.2 The court rejected Carlson's theory that the
indivisible injury doctrine applied to the facts of this case because the two
separate accidents lacked a causal relationship and were greatly separated in
time.2' Therefore, the court concluded that Carlson could only recover from KMart the damages that were proximately caused by K-Mart's negligence.22
Carlson appealed the appellate court's decision to the Missouri Supreme
Court, and the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals.23 The
Missouri Supreme Court held that when a verdict directing instruction is
modified to extend liability for damages directly caused by or contributed to by
a defendant's negligence, the damage instruction must "track the verdict
directing instruction." As such, Carlson was prejudiced by the trial court's
rejection of her proffered24damage instruction, and she was entitled to a new trial
on the issue of damages.

Second, Defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known
of this condition, and
Third, Defendant failed to use ordinary care to remove it, barricade it,
or warn of it,and
Fourth, such failure directly caused or directly contributed to cause
damage to the plaintiff.
Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 146 (quoting MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 17.02
(5th ed. 1996) (hereinafter MAI)as modified by MAI 19.01).
The trial court's damage instruction, however, stated the following:
If you find in favor of Plaintiff, then you must award Plaintiff such sum as
you believe will fairly and justly compensate Plaintiff for any damages you
believe she sustained and is reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a
direct result of the K-Mart occurrence.
Id. at 147 (quoting MAI 4.01).
Carlson's proposed damage instruction mirrored the verdict directing instruction
in that it allowed her to be compensated for damages "she sustained and is reasonably
certain to sustain in the future... directly caused or contributed to be caused by the
incident at K-Mart." Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 147.
19. Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., No. WD53151, 1998 WL 6951, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan. 13, 1998), aff'd inpart,rev'd in part, 979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998).

20. Id. at *8.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Carlson v. K-Mart, 979 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Mo. 1998).
24. Id. at 148.
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IL. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. MissouriApproach to the IndivisibleInjury Rule
The indivisible injury doctrine may be summarized as follows:
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two
or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is said to be responsible for the whole
injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the act of the
other tortfeasor, and the injured person may at his option or election
institute suit for the resulting damages against any one or more of such
tortfeasors separately, or against any number or all of them jointly."
Plaintiffs who have suffered a single, indivisible injury are required to make a
prima facie showing that the injury was a proximate result of the tortfeasors'
conduct. 6 The burden then shifts to the defendants to deny liability or prove that
the injury is, in fact, capable of apportionment.27 If this showing is not made,
each tortfeasor will be held jointly liable for the plaintiff's injuries.28
Multiple rationales have been proffered as the basis for the indivisible
injury rule. The first rationale is primarily evidentiary in nature and contends
that the injured plaintiff should not be required to prove the impossible, namely,
what portion of her damages are assignable to the respective defendants when
each of the defendants caused a single harm.29 This rationale seeks to avoid
placing a trier of fact in the position of making a completely arbitrary
apportionment of damages.3" The second rationale, on the other hand, relates to
the plaintiff's substantive, prima facie claim. This rationale states that multiple
tortfeasors causing a single injury may be held jointly liable "not because one
tortfeasor is responsible for the act of31the other, but because the conduct of each
is regarded as a cause of the injury."

25. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 62 (1974).
26. J.D. LEE &BARRYA. LiNDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION
§ 19.03 (rev. ed. 1988).
27. Id.

28.Id.
29. See Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., No. WD53151, 1998 WL 6951, at *3 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 13, 1998), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998); LEE &
LINDAHL, supra note 26, § 6.02.
30. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

347 (5th ed. 1984).
31. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 26, § 19.03.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/7

§ 52, at
4

1999]

Kleffner: Kleffner: Successive Torts Resulting in a Single, Indivisible Injury:
1007
SUCCESSIVE TORTS AND INDIVISIBLE INJURIES

Distinguishing between joint and several liability and the indivisible injury
rule often proves to be quite difficult.32 In fact, the Carlsoncourt stated that joint
and several liability and the indivisible injury rule are "simply specific instances
of the same basic rule."33 An early Missouri case, Meade v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway,34 illustrates this point. In Meade, a train station
employee doused the defendant, a hobo, with benzene while he slept on a
bench.35 When the plaintiff awoke, his legs were engulfed in flames.36 The
defendant denied setting the plaintiff ablaze and presented evidence tending to
show that a third party lit the match which ignited the plaintiff.37 The court
determined that the defendant was jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff s
single injury even if the defendant did not light the match. 38 The court likened
the act of pouring benzene on the plaintiff to a trespass and stated that "the
innocent or culpable act of a third person may be the immediate cause of the
injury and still an earlier wrongful act may have contributed so effectually to it
as to be regarded as the efficient, or at least the concurrent and responsible
cause." 39 In Meade, the court did not refer to the indivisible injury rule and
simply relied on ajoint liability theory. Nevertheless, the rationales for applying
the indivisible injury rule were present. Quite simply, the plaintiff suffered one
injury, bums to his legs. Because the plaintiff was asleep when both negligent
acts occurred, the plaintiff was unable to rationally apportion liability among the

32. Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff is permitted to join joint
tortfeasors in one action or sue each tortfeasor individually. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note

26, § 19.02. Joint and several liability may arise in a variety of contexts. LEE &
LINDAHL, supra note 26, § 19.01.
Professor Prosser indicated that multiple defendants may be jointly liable in the

following situations:
(1) where there is concerted action by the defendants resulting in the same
injury; (2) where there is vicarious liability; (3) where there is a common duty
owed by the defendants to the plaintiff; (4) where there is concurrent

causation of a single, indivisible result which neither defendant would have
caused alone; (5) where there is concurrent causation of a single indivisible

injury which either defendant would have caused alone; (6)where there are
successive injuries; (7) where there is damage of the same kind which is
difficult to apportion; (8)where there are acts innocent in themselves which
together cause damage; and (9)in the case of alternative liability.
LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 26, § 19.01.
33. Carlson, 1998 WL 6951, at *3. Professor Prosser would likely agree with this
characterization of the indivisible injury rule because he included "single indivisible
injur[ies]" in his list of situations where joint liability is appropriate. LEE & LINDAHL,
supra note 26, § 19.01.
34. 68 Mo. App. 92 (1896).
35. Meade v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 68 Mo. Ct. App. 92, 96 (1896).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 96-97.
38. Id. at 99-100.
39. Id. at 100.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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defendants. This proof difficulty was not fatal to the plaintiff's case, however,
because the court allowed him to hold the one known negligent actor jointly
liable for his total injury.40 Thus, the Meade court satisfied the evidentiary
rationale for the indivisible injury rule. The causation rationale was satisfied as
well. The Meade court stated:
No wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion or qualify his wrong, and
as a wrong has actually happened whilst his own wrongful act was in force
and operation, he ought not be permitted to set up as a defense that there
was a more immediate cause of the loss, if that cause was put into operation
by his own wrongful act.4'
Both acts (pouring the benzene over the plaintiff and lighting the match)
contributed to the plaintiff's indivisible injury, and both actors were jointly liable
for the plaintiff's damages.
Regardless of the similarity between the indivisible injury rule and joint
liability, early Missouri decisions refused to merge the two doctrines into one
rule. The case regarded as the first modem Missouri decision to apply the
indivisible injury rule is Brantley v. Couch.42 In Brantley, three cars proceeded
eastbound down Gravois Avenue in St. Louis.43 The first automobile, driven by
Mr. Eftink, stopped at an intersection because the light had changed from green
to yellow." Unable to stop quickly on the rain-slicked streets, the second car,
driven by Mr. Thompson, collided into the first car.45 Shortly thereafter, the
third car in the trio, driven by Mr. Couch, crashed into the rear of the second
car.46 The plaintiff, a passenger in the second car, suffered whiplash as a result
of the chain collision and sued all three drivers.47
At trial, the plaintiff stated that the impact of her car hitting the first car
'
"moved [her] forward just a little . . . [and] was slight."48
The second
impact-the third car hitting plaintiff's car from behind-occurred just seconds
after the first impact and with enough force to "throw[] [plaintiff] back in the
seat." 49 Although the two collisions significantly differed in force, medical
experts were unable to definitively state which impact caused the plaintiffs
injury."0 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 104.
Id. at 101.
383 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. at311.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 311-12. Because the plaintiff failed to prove causation, the trial court
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/7

6

Kleffner: Kleffner: Successive Torts Resulting in a Single, Indivisible Injury:

1999]

SUCCESSIVE TORTS AND INDIVISIBLE INJURIES

1009

remaining two defendants, but the trial court set aside the verdict against
Thompson.5' The plaintiff appealed the trial court's order with respect to
Thompson, and the court framed the issue in this fashion: Was there "sufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that plaintiff's indivisible
injury was the proximate result in whole or in part of the negligence of
Thompson in causing the first impact? 5 2 In light of the inconclusive medical
evidence regarding the divisibility of the injury and the short time interval
between collisions, the court of appeals answered this question in the affirmative
and determined that the trial court erred in setting aside the verdict against
Thompson. 3 In short, the operation of the indivisible injury rule exposed
Thompson to full liability for the plaintiff's injury regardless of his actual, causal
impact on that injury. 54
The successive collisions in Brantley were nearly instantaneous. Following
Brantley,however, courts wrestled with the applicability of the indivisible injury
doctrine when plaintiffs sought the benefit of the rule to hold a defendant liable
when independent negligent acts with distinct time intervals combined to cause
a single injury. One such case is Barlow v. Thornhill.55 In Barlow, the
defendant struck the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger. 6 The plaintiff
described this accident as a "light impact."57 Following the accident, the plaintiff
did not notice any physical pain, and he exited the vehicle while the drivers
exchanged insurance information.5" After ten to fifteen minutes, it began to rain,
and the parties to the accident reentered their respective vehicles.59 Another car
6
struck the plaintiff's car in the rear after the plaintiff reentered his vehicle. 0 This
accident was more severe, and following this accident, the plaintiff experienced
serious physical side effects such as vomiting, difficulty breathing, and neck and
rib pain. 61 Furthermore, the plaintiff subsequently developed severe
psychological problems. n2 At trial, the plaintiff's medical experts testified that
although the second accident was much more severe than the first, the plaintiff's
psychological problems resulted from both accidents, and it was impossible to
granted Mr. Eftink's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 309.
51. Id. at 309.
52. Id. at311.
53. Id. at 312.
54. Id.
55. 537 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Mo. 1976).

56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. at 415.
58. Id. at 414.
59. Id. 414-15.
60. Id.
61. Id. 415.
62. Id. at 415-16. Although there was no objective evidence of a neurological
disorder, one of the plaintiff's medical experts diagnosed the plaintiff with "posttraumatic psychoneurosis with conversion reaction, marked traumatic fixation with total
invalid reaction." Id. at 416.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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apportion the amount of damage attributable to each accident. 63 The defendant
argued that the' fifteen minutes that transpired between the accidents
distinguished this case from Brantley and precluded application of the indivisible
injury doctrine to the case.64 The court concluded, however, that
There is no arbitrary time limit the court could promulgate as being the
'cutoff point' for application of the rule. The gist of the rule with respect
to injuries is not so much the time separating the collisions as it is the
65
impossibility of definitely attributing a specific injury to each collision.
Based upon this reasoning, the court determined that the fifteen minute interval
did not preclude the application of the indivisible injury doctrine.66
In Barlow, the Missouri Supreme Court downplayed the impact of time on
the application of the indivisible injury doctrine. As a result, injured plaintiffs
sought to take advantage of the language in Barlow to hold independent
tortfeasors liable for a single injury
even though the negligent acts were widely
separated in time and space.67 State ex rel. Retherford v. Corcoran68 is an
example of such a case. In Corcoran,the plaintiff was involved in three separate
automobile accidents.69 The first accident occurred on May 25, 1977 in St. Louis
County, the second accident transpired on June 25, 1977 in St. Charles County,
and the final accident occurred October 25, 1978 in St. Charles County.7" The
plaintiff sued all three defendants and alleged that each successive injury
aggravated the injuries sustained in the first accident.7 The plaintiff also
claimed that she was unable to causally separate the degree of injury among the
three accidents and, therefore, common liability existed among the defendants.
The appellate court disagreed.72 Notwithstanding the liberal language in Barlow,
the Corcorancourt stated that in this case there were "three separate accidents
widely disparate in time and place ....
[D]ifficulty of proof does not create joint

63. Id. at 416.

64. Id. at419.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. See McDowell v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854, 861-62 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (claiming that motorcycle manufacturer's defective component and truck
driver's negligence combined to produce indivisible injury); Schiles v. Schaefer, 710
S.W.2d 254, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (claiming that multiple physicians who treated
decedent over a period of approximately eighteen days were liable for decedent's
wrongful death); Brickner v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 910, 912-

13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (claiming that three physicians negligently failed to diagnose
decedent's cancer and were liable for decedent's wrongful death).
68. 643 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

69. Id. at 845.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 846.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/7
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liability for these independent and unrelated torts. Each defendant has liability
for, and only liability for, the injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of that
defendant's accident." 73 Therefore, the court required proof as to each
defendant's contribution to the plaintiff's injury.74
The heavy emphasis on temporal and spatial arrangement in Corcoran
conflicted with language in Barlow which indicated that these factors were
relatively unimportant. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, both the
Corcoranand Barlow courts seemed to disagree about the underlying rationale
for the indivisible injury rule. On the one hand, the Missouri Supreme Court, in
Barlow, announced that the basis for the rule was primarily evidentiary: A
plaintiff should not be required to prove the extent of each tortfeasor's damage
when doing so is nearly impossible.75 On the other hand, the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri in Corcoranassumed a factuallyoriented stance: The facts of the case, rather than difficult problems of proof,
dictated the applicability of the doctrine.76 The Missouri Supreme Court in State
ex reL Jinkerson v. KoehrT7 resolved the conflict in favor of the court of appeal's
interpretation.
Factually, Jinkerson involved a situation similar to the aforementioned
cases. 71 The plaintiff's misfortune involved two distinct automobile accidents,
the first occurring on March 12, 1986 in St. Louis County.79 The second

73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412,419 (Mo. 1976).
76. State ax rel. Retherford v. Corcoran, 643 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
77. 826 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Mo. 1992).
78. As an aside, not all indivisible injury cases involve automobile chain collisions.
For example, in Sanders v. Wallace, 817 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), a tractor
rolled down an incline and injured a farmhand. The plaintiff, the farmhand, brought a
products liability action against the manufacturer of the tractor for failure to equip the
tractor with a manual brake as well as a negligence claim against the owner of the tractor.
The plaintiff claimed that both negligent acts combined to cause his injuries. The court
agreed, stating:
The defendants are clearly joint tortfeasors in the sense that they are persons
whose independent acts have coalesced to cause a single indivisible injury.
Where concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
each is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the act of the other tortfeasor.
Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
The court determined that either defendant could have prevented the plaintiff's injuries
and held that both defendants were responsible for the entire injury. Id.
79. State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr, 826 S.W.2d 346, 346 (Mo. 1992).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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accident transpired on February 26, 1987 in the City of St. Louis.80 The precise
issue before the court was whether the Circuit Court of St. Louis County had
venue over the action against the defendant in the first accident.8 The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant in the first accident shared liability with the defendant
in the second accident because "the injuries sustained in the two accidents were
not separate and distinct but inseparable and indistinguishable."8 Therefore, the
plaintiff argued that both defendants were jointly liable, and venue could be
established over both defendants in the City of St. Louis. 3 The Missouri
Supreme Court disagreed because the facts of the case "[did] not call for the
application ofjoint liability."' 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to
Missouri's permissivejoinder rule which allows multiple defendants to be joined
in one action:
[I]f there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrences or series of transactions or occurrences and
if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action.85
The court specifically noted that "[t]he two accidents alleged in the.., petition
did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 86 As such, "each
defendant [was] responsible for the injuries caused in the accident in which he
or she was involved,, 8 ' and the plaintiffs were required to independently
establish venue for each cause of action notwithstanding the fact that each
defendant contributed to a single, indivisible injury.88
In deciding whether the indivisible injury rule applied to the case, the
Missouri Supreme Court in Jinkerson clearly opted for the factually-based
approach used in Corcoran. Subsequent courts have adhered to the rule
9 The state of the law of indivisible injuries in
announced in Jinkerson."
Missouri, once awash with conflicting precedent and competing policies, is now
quite clear. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri
in Carltonv. Phillips90 aptly described the state of the law when they declared,

80. Id.
81. Id. at 347.
82. Id. at 348.
83. Id. at 347-48.

84. Id. at 348.
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.040 (1994); State ex rel.Jinkerson v. Koehr, 826 S.W.2d
346, 348 (Mo. 1992).
86. Jinkerson,826 S.W.2d at 348.
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Carlton v. Phillips, 926 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
90. 926 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). The court in Carlton refused to apply the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/7
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"[i]t is apparent . . . that multiple defendants in separate, unrelated, yet
successive auto accidents cannot be held jointly liable under Missouri law as it
now stands."'
B. Outside Jurisdictions'Approachto the IndivisibleInjury Rule
Missouri is not alone in dealing with difficult issues associated with
application of the indivisible injury doctrine. Just as Missouri debated the issue,
courts outside Missouri have addressed whether temporal proximity is necessary
for application of the indivisible injury rule. Litigation on this issue has
produced mixed results. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court in Maddux
v. Donaldson92 entertained a dispute involving a plaintiff injured as a result of
two successive automobile collisions separated in time by only thirty seconds.93
Although recognizing the general rule that plaintiffs must apportion damages
among tortfeasors, 94 the Maddux court noted that, in the context of single,
indivisible injuries, this requirement contravened policy concerns when it stated,
When we impose upon an injured plaintiff the necessity of proving
which impact did which harm in a chain collision situation, what we
are actually expressing is a judicial policy that it is better that a
plaintiff, injured through no fault of his own, take nothing, than that
a tortfeasor pay more than his theoretical share of the damages
accruing out of a confused situation which his wrong has helped to
create .... It is clear that there is a manifest unfairness in putting on
the injured party the impossible burden of proving the specific shares
of harm done by each. Such results are simply the law's callous
dullness to innocent sufferers. 95
Although the second collision occurred only thirty seconds after the first impact,
the court mentioned that the timing of the collisions was "without legal
significance .... [because] [t]he reason for the rule as to joint liability for
damages was the indivisibility of the injuries, not the timing of the various

indivisible injury doctrine when the plaintiffhad been injured in two separate automobile
accidents. Id. at 11-12. The accidents, which occurred two months apart, caused injuries
to the plaintiff's cervical spine. Id. at 10. The plaintiff s treating doctors testified that
they could not, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, determine what
proportion of the plaintiffs injuries were attributable to each accident. Id.
91. Id. at 12.
92. 108 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 1961).

93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 35-36 (quoting John H. Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasorsand Severance of
Damages, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923)).
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blows. 9 6 The Maddux court concluded that there was "no reason why [the]
tortfeasors should escape liability because of the very complexity of the injury
created by their wrong" 97 and allowed the plaintiff to hold either tortfeasor liable
for the entire injury.9"
Similarly, in D & WJones, Inc. v. Collier,99 the Mississippi Supreme Court
implicitly rejected the importance of temporal proximity with respect to the
propriety of the indivisible injury doctrine. In Collier,an owner of a commercial
catfish operation sued five farmers whose property bordered the five hundred
acre catfish complex. 0 The plaintiff alleged that the farmers knowingly applied
Toxaphene, a pesticide toxic to aquatic life, to their crops during 1974.'0' This

toxin subsequently contaminated or killed the plaintiff's catfish and prohibited

their harvest the following year.' 2 Because the plaintiff was unable to prove the
precise amount of damage caused by each defendant, he claimed that the
combined application of Toxaphene over a period of several weeks during 1974
produced the entire result.10 3 The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and held
that the bordering fanner's "separate, concurrent and successive negligent
acts"' caused a single, indivisible injury to the plaintiff's catfish operation." 5
As such, the defendants were jointly and severally liable for their negligent acts
notwithstanding the fact that the Toxaphene was applied over the course of
several weeks."00
Not all courts outside Missouri follow the Maddux and Collierapproach
and denounce the importance of the temporal proximity between independent
torts which produce indivisible injuries. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Caygillv. Ipsen'0 7 prohibited joinder of two tortfeasors whose negligent
acts injured the plaintiff but occurred five months apart and in different
locations. 8 Although the Caygill court noted that denyingjoinder of defendants

96. Id. at 38. For another example of a court diminishing the importance of time
between independent negligent acts with respect to application of the indivisible injury
rule, see HawaiianIns. & Guar. Co. v. Mead, 538 P.2d 865, 871-72 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975) (noting that time between the negligent acts is not the determinative factor in
indivisible injury cases).
97. Maddux, 108 N.W.2d at 38.
98. Id.
99. 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979).
100. Id. at 288-89. The plaintiff also sued two businesses involved in the aerial
application of pesticide. Id. at 289.
101. Id. at 289.
102. Id. at 290.
103. Id. at 293-94.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 294.
Id.
Id.
135 N.W.2d 284 (Wis. 1965).
Id. at 286.
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in a case of this type may be quite "harsh,"' 9 the court nevertheless required that
the plaintiff prove her damages with "reasonable certainty."" Because the
plaintiff could not medically apportion damages in accordance with this
standard, the separate accidents were not allowed to be joined in one action.",
The Caygill court did not, however, "rule out the possibility ofjoinder where the
acts are consecutive ' but
are closely enough related in a time sequence to
2
constitute one event."
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Although the language in the aforementioned cases indicated that temporal
proximity was not a necessary ingredient to the application of the indivisible
injury doctrine, the fact remains that, in the cases where the rule was found to be
applicable, the independent negligent acts occurred relatively close in time. This
trend did not bode well for Carlson who, notwithstanding the Missouri Supreme
Court's language inJinkerson, sought to hold K-Mart entirely responsible for her
damages even though two additional factors, the subsequent auto accident and
the degenerative disk disease, may have contributed to her injury."' After
reviewing this case authority, the Western District initially noted:
While we do not see that some sort of common factual basis or causal
connection is logically necessary given the original policy behind the
indivisible injury rule, we note that the unmistakable trend of developments
in the law of negligence in Missouri has been to require some factual,
causal, or temporal connection between the events causing injury."'
The court admitted, however, that this "unmistakable trend""' 5 placed a difficult
burden upon Carlson and other similarly situated plaintiffs when it stated:
We see no easy answer to the difficulty faced by plaintiff in the
circumstances of this case, where the inability to scientifically fix the

109. Id. at 290.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 291; see also Georges v. Duncan, 295 A.2d 809, 811 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1972) (citing Caygill as authority and refusing to join defendants whose negligent
acts occurred four months apart and resulted in a single injury to the plaintiff), cert.
denied, 268 Md. 748 (1973).
112. Caygill, 135 N.W.2d at 289; see also Duran v. Mission Mortuary, 258 P.2d
241, 251 (Kan. 1953) (requiring that independent acts of negligence be "related and
interwoven in [a] point of time").
113. Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., No. WD53151, 1998 WL 6951, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan 13, 1998), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998).
114. Id. at *7.
115. Id.
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degree of the injury caused by one defendant creates problems of proof, yet
there is no causal relation between the two incidents, and the incidents are
not closely connected in time. Plaintiff has an interest in receiving full
compensation for the injuries caused by the defendant. The defendant has
an interest in having liability be determined according to the defendant's
actual fault. In a case in which plaintiff's injuries flowing from defendant's
tortious conduct cannot be determined due to the fact of injury from another
source, there is special tension between these two interests. It appears that,
under the ruling in Jinkerson,plaintiff may be precluded from going to trial
against both defendants in the same cause unless there is a causal or close
temporal relationship between the two incidents. Thus, the interrelatedness
of the procedural rule and the substantive law may augment the challenge
for a plaintiff unable to apportion the respective injuries." 6
Nevertheless, in adhering to Missouri precedent, the court bowed to the great
weight of outside authority and refused to allow Carlson the benefit of the
indivisible injury rule." 7 Relying heavily on Jinkerson and Carlton, the court
concluded that Carlson could only recover damages that were proximately
caused by K-Mart's negligence because both accidents lacked a causal

relationship and were widely separated in time and space."'
V. COMMENT
Two theories provide guidance in determining whether a court decision is
correct. First, an objective individual may consider a case to be correctly
decided in light of prior precedent. Another objective person may believe that
a judicial decision is correct if the interests of justice are served. Under the latter
view, prior case authority may guide the decision, but if that precedent dictates
an unfair outcome, it is rejected so that a proper outcome is reached. This
dilemma, of course, does not exist if case law dictates a just result. When the
interests of promoting justice and following precedent clash, however, conflict
ensues, and one interest must be sacrificed in favor of preserving the other. As
the Carlsoncourt recognized, this clash of interests was profoundly at issue in
the instant case.
The Carlson court clearly adhered to prior precedent. In fact, the decision
in Jinkerson effectively predetermined the outcome in Carlson. By requiring
plaintiffs seeking application of the indivisible injury doctrine to prove that the
independent torts causing the injury arose "out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,""' 9 the Jinkerson court

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at *9.
Id.

Id.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.040 (1)(1994).
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essentially precluded application of the indivisible injury rule when the
independent torts are widely separated in time and space. As a result, Carlson
faced an uphill battle because the two accidents occurred nearly six months apart
and in different locations. 2 ' Clearly, both accidents were not part of the "same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." 12' Because no
other theory of joint liability supported Carlson's claims,' she faced the
difficult, if not impossible, task of apportioning K-Mart's responsibility for her
back injury. This outcome precisely followed Jinkerson's mandate, and is
correct in light of the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in that case.
Whether the Carlsonoutcome served the interests ofjustice, fairness, and
equity is another matter, however. It is true that the jury awarded Carlson
$100,000 for her injury, but justice does not hinge solely on the monetary
outcome of a case. Justice requires that the means used to achieve a result be
equitable, efficient, and evenhanded.
Following Jinkerson, plaintiffs with an indivisible injury are required to
prove the impossible.l 23 Apportioning damages to the defendant is critical to a
plaintiff's prima facie case because apportionment directly relates to the

elements of causation and damages, elements of proof fundamental to a
negligence cause of action. Now, simply because of the nature of her injury, an
injured party risks not collecting for her injury because she is unable to apportion
damages to the defendant. Furthermore, even if a plaintiff survives a motion for
directed verdict, the trier of fact will be forced to arbitrarily allocate a percentage
of fault to the single defendant before the court. For the plaintiff, this is a risk.
In a typical personal injury case, a significant percentage of a plaintiff s damages
arise from medical expenses. Such damages are fixed, easily calculable, and do
not involve speculation.'24 Therefore, because the nature of a plaintiff's injury
prevents her from being able to specifically allocate the exact amount of

120. Carlson v. K-Mart Corp, 979 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Mo. 1998).
121. Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.040 (1)(1994).
122. Aside from indivisible injuries arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
series of transactions or occurrences, joint liability under Missouri law may be
established if 1)the defendants participated in concerted action, 2) the defendants had a
common duty to the plaintiff, or 3) the defendants are vicariously liable. See Brickner
v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). None
of these theories supported Carlson's claim.

123. This fact is illustrated by the instant case. At trial, no medical expert "testified
that it was possible to segregate the injury or exacerbation caused by the automobile
accident from the injury caused by the K-Mart incident." Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 146.
Another expert, however, was of the opinion that "any effect of the automobile collision
was negligible, and that all of plaintiff's problems were attributable to the incident at K-

Mart." Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., No. WD 53151, 1998 WL 6951, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan. 13 1998), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998). Furthermore, the
medical experts disagreed whether Carlson's degenerative back disease played a role in

causing her back pain. Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 146.
124. This refers only to past, not future, medical expenses.
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damages to the defendant, the jury will likely reduce the plaintiff s award or
award nothing whatsoever. Hence, a plaintiff will be left without full
compensation for her actual medical expenses. This outcome is especially
troubling for plaintiffs with modest resources because, for such plaintiffs,
reimbursement of medical expenses is of critical importance. Unfortunately, the
indivisible injury doctrine as applied in Missouri fails to achieve this end. First,
poorer plaintiffs will likely be financially unable to individually sue each
defendant. In such a case, any hope of recovery is lost. Even if an injured
plaintiff can afford to individually sue each tortfeasor, the heightened burden of
proof imposed by the indivisible injury doctrine significantly reduces the
plaintiff s chances of recovery. Quite simply, poorer plaintiffs are substantially
affected and disadvantaged by this rule.
Injured plaintiffs are not the only parties who will suffer under this result,
however. The judicial system will suffer as well. Under Missouri's
interpretation of the indivisible injury doctrine, plaintiffs who have incurred
single injuries from independent tortfeasors must sue each tortfeasor individually
rather than combining defendants in one action and allowing the defendants to
prove the extent of their fault. Under this scenario, an injured plaintiff may bring
multiple lawsuits, and, in each one, present inconclusive medical evidence as to
the cause of her injury. Because the trier of fact will be forced to arbitrarily
allocate damages in a number of cases, the court system risks subjecting the
parties to inconsistent verdicts if a plaintiff decides to try each defendant
separately.
This is precisely the outcome that jurisdictions applying the indivisible

injury rule without temporal requirement sought to avoid. Now, both the
evidentiary and causation rationales for the rule are thwarted. Traditionally, the
evidentiary rationale, the indivisible injury rule, and, on a larger scale, joint and
several liability, "obviate[d] a plaintiff's burden of proving which share of the
injury each of the several defendants was responsible for; the burden of proof
[was] removed from the innocent plaintiff and placed upon the wrongdoers to
determine themselves."' 25 As illustrated by the instant case, Missouri has turned
the evidentiary rationale on its head and shifted the burden of proof back to a
plaintiff to apportion her damages.
The second rationale, the causation rationale, attempted to place every
defendant before the court because each tortfeasor proximately caused the
plaintiff s injury. 126 The Jinkersonrule, as applied in the instant case, works in
piecemeal fashion, however. A plaintiff can sue each and every defendant
individually with the hope that, in the end, she will be fully compensated.
Clearly, this result fails to promote judicial efficiency. Under the doctrine as it
now stands, plaintiffs must separately sue independent tortfeasors even though
the degree and severity of a plaintiff's damages are legal and factual questions

125. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 26, § 19.02.
126. Id. § 19.03.
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common to all defendants. Judicial resources are wasted by this inefficient
process. This is especially troubling in light of today's overburdened court
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The indivisible injury rule penalizes plaintiffs simply because of the type
of injury received. Under Missouri law, innocent plaintiffs who received single,
indivisible injuries must place every tortfeasor before the court and attempt to
prove the impossible. Specifically, plaintiffs suffering from single, indivisible
injuries must apportion their damages among the tortfeasors even though doing
so is medically impossible.
This outcome, although not in conflict with prior case authority, is at odds
with the guiding principles of justice, fairness, and equity. The original
causation and evidentiary rationales behind the indivisible injury rule were
founded on these principles. Court decisions like Carlson and Jinkerson,
however, have stripped these rationales from their proper place in Missouri law.
Quite simply, these rationales have suffered an indivisible injury of their
own--death.

MICHAEL J. KLEFFNER
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